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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) begins its work investigating wartime 
atrocities and prosecuting those who are criminally responsible, it will encounter countless 
acts of sexual violence.  This report is a resource to assist in the effective analysis, 
prosecution, and adjudication of crimes involving sexual violence. 
The ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Court for Rwanda (“ICTR”), have convicted 
individuals of crimes against humanity and war crimes for various acts of sexual violence 
including rape, sexual mutilation, and sexual slavery.  Perpetrators of acts like these have 
been convicted of enslavement, torture, rape, persecution, and other inhumane acts as crimes 
against humanity; torture, cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity, including 
rape, as violations of the laws and customs of war; and the grave breaches of inhuman 
treatment and wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.  In addition 
to holding individuals criminally liable for sexual crimes, evidence regarding sexual violence 
has been relevant in establishing an important element for genocide charges—serious bodily 
or mental harm.  Evidence of sexual violence has also been used to demonstrate a consistent 
pattern of conduct.1 
This report provides lawyers, judges, academics, and activists with an overview of the 
jurisprudence that has developed at the ad hoc tribunals regarding sexual crimes.  Each 
section begins with the elements of the relevant crimes as outlined in the ICC Elements of 
Crimes and then discusses the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence. 
II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION:  THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS AND THE ICC 
The ad hoc tribunals and the ICC have similar subject matter jurisdictional mandates.  
All three institutions have jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of 
the laws and customs of war, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.  The Rome 
Statute2 however specifies a greater number of sexual violence crimes than either the ICTY 
Statute or the ICTR Statute. 
                                                
1
 See ICTY Rule 93, ICTR Rule 93. 
2
 The Rome Statute is the document establishing the ICC and granting the ICC its jurisdictional mandate. 
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A. Crimes Against Humanity 
All three institutions have jurisdiction over enslavement, torture, rape, persecution, 
and other inhumane acts.  The Rome Statute, however, enumerates sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence 
of comparable gravity as within its jurisdiction as crimes against humanity.  The ad hoc 
tribunals have not ignored these specific forms of sexual violence, but they were not 
specifically enumerated within their jurisdictional mandates.  The ICTY and the ICTR have 
held that they have jurisdiction over these forms of sexual violence as crimes against 
humanity based on their jurisdiction over “other inhumane acts.”  The ad hoc tribunals’ 
statutes grant jurisdiction over persecution on political, racial and religious grounds.  The 
Rome Statute’s grant of jurisdiction over persecution is broader.  It includes persecution  
against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds 
that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in 
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.3 
B. War Crimes 
The ICTY, ICTR, and ICC have jurisdiction over torture or inhuman treatment, 
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and outrages upon 
personal dignity.  The category of outrages upon personal dignity at the ICTR specifically 
mentions humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of 
indecent assault.4  The Rome Statute creates separate sub-categories for rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, any other form of sexual 
violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions (for international armed 
conflicts), or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of article 
3 common to the four Geneva Conventions (for non-international armed conflicts).5 
Part III provides a detailed overview of the elements of the crimes relevant for acts of 
sexual violence within the ICC’s jurisdiction and the supporting jurisprudence from the ad 
hoc tribunals. 
                                                
3
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Annex II at art. 7(1)(h),  
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
4
 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 & Annex at art. 4(e) (1994) 
[hereinafter ICTR Statute].  
5
 Rome Statute at art. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi). 
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III. AD HOC TRIBUNAL SEXUAL VIOLENCE JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Genocide 
Article 6 of the Rome Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction over genocide.  Genocide is 
defined as: 
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
Acts of sexual violence, like rape, constitute the actus reus for genocide because they cause 
“serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.”  If such acts are committed with 
the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” then 
they qualify as genocide.  This connection between sexual violence, specifically rape, and 
genocide was first made in 1998 by the ICTR in the Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgment.6 
 The ICC Elements of Crimes lists the elements for each of the five categories of 
genocidal acts that can constitute genocide.  As acts of sexual violence typically fall within 
Articles 6(b) (causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group) and 6(d) 
(imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group), this section will address 
those genocidal acts.   
Article 6(b) of the ICC Elements of Crimes states that the elements for genocide by 
causing serious bodily or mental harm are that: 
1.  The perpetrator caused serious bodily or mental harm to one or more 
persons.* 
 
2.  Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group. 
 
3.  The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. 
 
4.  The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar 
                                                
6
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment at para. 731 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu 
Trial Judgment]. 
*
 This conduct may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman 
or degrading treatment. 
10 
conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself 
effect such destruction. 
 
Pursuant to Article 6(d) of the ICC Elements of Crimes, genocide by imposing measures 
intended to prevent births requires showing that: 
1.  The perpetrator imposed certain measures upon one or more persons. 
 
2.  Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group. 
 
3.  The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. 
 
4.  The measures imposed were intended to prevent births within that 
group. 
 
5.  The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar 
conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself 
effect such destruction. 
 
Article 4 of the ICTY Statute and Article 2 of the ICTR Statute grant the respective 
tribunals jurisdiction over genocide.  In Akayesu the Trial Chamber stated that rape and 
sexual violence are some “of the worst ways [to] inflict harm on the victim as he or she 
suffers both bodily and mental harm.”7  In Rwanda sexual violence was an integral part of the 
process of destroying the Tutsi population.  Tutsi women were specifically targeted and raped 
and other acts of sexual violence contributed to their destruction and the destruction of the 
Tutsi group.8 
 The idea that rape and other acts of sexual violence satisfy the serious bodily and 
mental harm element of genocide has been confirmed by the Trial Chambers in Kayishema, 
Musema, Krstić, Kamuhanda, Stakic, Kajelijeli, and Gacumbitsi.9 
                                                
7
 Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 6, at para. 731. 
8
 Id. at para. 731, 732 (“Tutsi women were subjected to sexual violence because they were Tutsi.  Sexual 
violence was a step in the process of destruction of the tutsi [sic] group - destruction of the spirit, of the will to 
live, and of life itself.”). 
9
 Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment & Sentence at para. 108 (May 21, 
1999) [hereinafter Kayishema Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13, Judgment & 
Sentence at para. 156 (Jan. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Musema Trial Judgment] (“the Chamber understands the 
words ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ to include, but not limited to, acts of bodily or mental torture, inhumane 
or degrading treatment, rape, sexual violence, and persecution. The Chamber is of the opinion that ‘serious 
harm’ need not entail permanent or irremediable harm.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment at 
paras. 509, 513 (Aug. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Krstić Trial Judgment] (In subscribing to the above case-law, the 
Chamber holds that inhuman treatment, torture, rape, sexual abuse and deportation are among the acts which 
may cause serious bodily or mental injury.”); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment & 
Sentence at para. 634 (Sept. 4, 1998) [hereinafter Kamuhanda Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. 
11 
 Measures intended to prevent births within the group has been held to include both 
physical and mental measures.10  Physical measures include sexual mutilation, enforced 
sterilization, forced birth control, forced separation of males and females, and the prohibition 
of marriages.11 
 In Kayishema, the Trial Chamber concluded that there is a connection between rape 
and another actus reus for genocide—deliberately inflicting on the targeted group conditions 
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.  The Trial 
Chamber held that this concept includes “circumstances which will lead to a slow death, for 
example, lack of proper housing, clothing, hygiene and medical care or excessive work or 
physical exertion.”12  Concluding that deliberately inflicting, on a group, conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part includes acts that do not 
immediately lead to the death of members of the group, the Trial Chamber held that such 
conditions include rape.13  Despite these pronouncements the accused in Kayishema were 
convicted of genocide based on killing and causing serious bodily and mental harm.14  The 
serious bodily and mental harm element was supported with evidence of mutilations and 
rapes.15 
 Rape and other acts of sexual violence have also been used to establish an accused’s 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.  In 
Niyitegeka the Trial Chamber held that “ordering Interahamwe to undress a Tutsi woman, and 
to insert a sharpened piece of wood into her genitalia, after ascertaining that she was of the 
Tutsi ethnic group” and leaving the body “with the piece of wood protruding from it, in plain 
view on a public road for some three days thereafter” helped establish the Accused’s intent to 
destroy the Tutsi ethnic group.16  In Muhimana the Trial Chamber found that Muhimana 
                                                                                                                                                    
IT-97-24, Judgment at 516 (July 31, 2003) [hereinafter Stakic Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case 
No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment & Sentence at para. 815 (Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Kajelijeli Trial Judgment] 
(noting the Trial Chambers of the ICTR have held that serious bodily harm includes the nonmortal acts of sexual 
violence, rape, and mutilation); Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment at para. 291 
(June 17, 2004) [hereinafter Gacumbitsi Trial Judgment] (“Serious bodily harm means any form of physical 
harm or act that causes serious bodily injury to the victim, such as torture and sexual violence. Serious bodily 
harm does not necessarily mean that the harm is irremediable.”). 
10
 Musema Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 158.  
11
 Id. 
12
 Kayishema Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 115. 
13
 Id. at para. 116. 
14
 Id. at para. 547. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment & Sentence at para. 416 (May 16, 2003) 
[hereinafter Niyitegeka Trial Judgment]. 
12 
targeted Tutsi civilians during attacks by shooting and raping them.17  He was found to have 
apologized to a young girl he raped after he realized that she was Hutu and not Tutsi and to 
have specifically referred to the Tutsi identity of his victims.18  Based on this evidence the 
Trial Chamber concluded that Muhimana intended to destroy, in whole or in part, the Tutsi 
group.19 
B. Crimes Against Humanity 
The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity pursuant to article 7 of the 
Rome Statute.  The ad hoc tribunals’ jurisdiction over crimes against humanity is based on 
articles 5 and 3 of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes respectively.  The ad hoc tribunals’ statutes 
enumerate nine crimes that constitute crimes against humanity when they are committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population.20  The ICTY Statute 
states that the nine enumerated crimes are crimes against humanity when they are committed 
in an armed conflict, international or non-international, and are directed against any civilian 
population.21  The ICTR’s jurisdiction over crimes against humanity is narrower than that of 
the ICTY’s.  The ICTY Statute follows the customary international law approach, while the 
ICTR requires the acts to have taken place as part of a discriminatory attack—an attack on 
national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds.22 
The Tadic Trial Chamber concluded that crimes against humanity include a 
discriminatory intent mens rea requirement, which was reversed on appeal.  The Tadic 
Appeals Chamber held that the  
Prosecution was correct in submitting that the Trial Chamber erred in finding 
that all crimes against humanity require a discriminatory intent. Such an intent 
is an indispensable legal ingredient of the offence only with regard to those 
crimes for which this is expressly required, that is, for Article 5 (h), 
concerning various types of persecution.23 
The ICC follows the customary international law definition like the ICTY after the Tadic 
Appeals Judgment.  A crime against humanity for purposes of ICC jurisdiction exists when 
                                                
17
 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-I, Judgment & Sentence at para. 517 (Apr. 28, 2005) 
[hereinafter Muhimana Trial Judgment]. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Id. at para. 518. 
20
 ICTR Statute at art. 3; S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc S/RES/827 at art. 
5 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
21
 ICTY Statute at art. 5. 
22
 ICTR Statute at art. 3.  
23
 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-95-1-A, Judgment at para. 305 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadic Appeals 
Judgment]. 
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an act in one of eleven enumerated categories is “committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”24 
Thus the common elements for all of the crimes against humanity discussed below are 
that: 
1. There must be an attack.  
2. The acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack.  
3. The attack must be “directed against any civilian population.”  
4. The attack must be widespread and systematic, and  
5. The perpetrator must know of the wider context in which he or she is 
acting and that his or her acts are part of the attack. 
 
1. Enslavement 
Enslavement is a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(C) of the Rome Statute.  
The ICC Elements of Crimes defines the elements of enslavement as follows: 
1.  The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right 
of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, 
lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them 
a similar deprivation of liberty.* 
 
2.  The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against a civilian population. 
 
3.  The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the 
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
a civilian population. 
 
 At the ad hoc tribunals enslavement is a crime against humanity under Article 5(c) of 
the ICTY Statute and Article 3(c) of the ICTR Statute.  There has been one significant case to 
address enslavement and that is the Foca case before the ICTY.25  The ICTY Appeals 
Chamber stated that enslavement is a crime against humanity in customary international law. 
An enslaved person is one “over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership are exercised.”26   The actus rea for enslavement is the exercise of any or all of the 
                                                
24
 Rome Statute at art. 7. 
*
 It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, include exacting forced labour or 
otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of 
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the 
conduct described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and children. 
25
 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1, Judgment (Feb. 22, 2001) [hereinafter 
Foca Trial Judgment]. 
26
 The Appeals Chamber preferred this language, which was used in the 1926 Slavery Convention, to that used 
by the Trial Chamber.  The Trial Chamber stated that enslavement consists of “the exercise of any or all of the 
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powers attaching to the right of ownership.  Whether specific conditions constitute 
enslavement depends on the operation of various indicia of slavery.27  The indicia of slavery 
identified by the Appeals Chamber include: 
control over someone’s movement, control of physical environment, 
psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat 
of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel 
treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labor.28  
The mere ability to buy, sell, trade, or inherit a person or his or her labor is insufficient to 
establish enslavement, but the actual occurrence of such actions would be relevant.29   
On December 4, 2001, the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial 
of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery (“Tokyo Tribunal”) issued its judgment, which found 
Emperor Hirohito and other high-ranking officials guilty of rape and sexual slavery as crimes 
against humanity based on individual and command responsibility.30  While this judgment 
was issued by a people’s tribunal and is not legally binding, its analysis of sexual slavery is 
thorough and progressive.  Such analysis can serve as a guide for future sexual slavery cases.  
As noted above the ICC Elements of Crimes defines sexual slavery as existing when a 
perpetrator exercises “any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or 
more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, 
or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty” and causes such a person “to engage 
in one or more acts of a sexual nature.”31  The Tokyo Tribunal similarly held that the actus 
reus of sexual slavery is “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over a person.”32  The Tokyo Tribunal, however, went further in explicitly stating 
that “exercising sexual control over a person or depriving a person of sexual autonomy” 
constitutes a power attaching to the right of ownership.33   
                                                                                                                                                    
powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person.”  Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, Vukovic, Case No. 
IT-96-23&23/1, Judgment at para. 118 (June 12, 2002) [hereinafter Foca Appeals Judgment] (quoting Trial 
Judgment at para. 539).  The Appeals Chamber stated that because “the law does not know of a ‘right of 
ownership over a person,’” the more guarded language of 1926 Slavery Convention is preferable.  Id. 
27
 Id. at para. 119. 
28
 Id. (quoting Trial Chamber at para. 543). 
29
 Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 543. 
30
 Judgment on the Common Indictment and the Application for Restitution and Reparation, at paras. 874-75 (4 
Dec. 2001) (Women’s Int’l War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery) [hereinafter 
Tokyo Judgment]. 
31
 ICC Elements of Crimes, arts. 7(1)(g)-2, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2, 8(2)(e)(vi)-2. 
32
 Tokyo Judgment, supra note 30, at para. 620. 
33
 Id. at para. 620. 
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The mens rea requirement for enslavement as stated in Foca is intentionally 
exercising, over another person, a power attaching to the right of ownership.34 
a. Non-Elements that Could Be Relevant Factors 
(1) Consent 
 The Foca Appeals Chamber specifically stated that lack of consent is not an element 
of the crime of enslavement,35 but consent may be relevant for determining whether the 
accused exercised powers attaching to the right of ownership with respect to a specific victim 
or whether the victim voluntarily consented to take part in the relevant activities.36 
(2) Duration 
 Duration is not an element of the crime of enslavement.  The Foca Appeals Chamber 
stated that the key issue is the “quality of the relationship between the accused and the 
victim.”37  Duration is one of many factors that should be examined to determine the quality 
of the relationship.38 
2. Torture 
Torture is a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(f) of the Rome Statute and 
Article 5(f) of the ICTY Statue and Article 3(f) of the ICTR Statue.  The ICC Elements of 
Crimes defines the elements of torture as follows: 
1. The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering 
upon one or more persons. 
 
2. Such person or persons were in the custody or under the control of the 
perpetrator. 
 
3. Such pain or suffering did not arise only from, and was not inherent in 
or incidental to, lawful sanctions. 
 
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
                                                
34
 Foca Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, at para. 122. 
35
 Id. at para. 120 (“Indeed, the Appeals Chamber does not accept the premise that lack of consent is an element 
of the crime since, in its view, enslavement flows from claimed rights of ownership; accordingly, lack of consent 
does not have to be proved by the Prosecutor as an element of the crime.”) (emphasis added). 
36
 The Appeals Chamber stated that “from an evidential point of view as going to the question whether the 
Prosecutor has established the element of the crime relating to the exercise by the accused of any or all of the 
powers attaching to the right of ownership.  In this respect, the Appeals Chamber considers that circumstances 
which render it impossible to express consent may be sufficient to presume the absence of consent.”  Id..  
37
 Id. at para. 121. 
38
 Id.  
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attack directed against a civilian population. 
 
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the 
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
a civilian population.39 
 
 Rape and other acts of sexual violence have been charged as torture at the ad hoc 
tribunals.  Rape constitutes torture when the elements of torture are met.40  The ad hoc 
tribunals require the severe pain or suffering necessary for torture to be inflicted for a specific 
purpose—to obtain “information or a confession, or at punishing, intimidating or coercing the 
victim or a third person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third 
person.”  This element does not exist at the ICC and there is a specific note in the ICC 
Elements of Crimes for torture as a crime against humanity stating that “It is understood that 
no specific purpose need be proved for this crime.”41   
The elements for torture as a crime against humanity before the ad hoc tribunals are: 
(i) The infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental. 
 
(ii) The act or omission must be intentional. 
 
(iii) The act or omission must aim at obtaining information or a confession, 
or at punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or 
at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person.42   
 
Prior to 2001, the ad hoc tribunals had a fourth element for torture.  This element stated that 
“[t]he perpetrator was himself an official, or acted at the instigation of, or with the consent or 
acquiescence of, an official or person acting in an official capacity.”43   
In 2001, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Foca held that pursuant to customary 
international law, torture does not have to be committed by an official, at the instigation of an 
                                                
39
 The heading for torture as a crime against humanity notes that “It is understood that no specific purpose need 
be proved for this crime.”  International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes, Assembly of States Parties to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1st Sess., Sept. 3-10, 2002, Part II(B) at art. 7(1)(f), ICC-
ASP/1/3 (2002) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes]. 
40
 Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1, Judgment at para. 145 (Nov. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Kvočka Trial 
Judgment]. 
41
 ICC Elements of Crimes at Art. 7(1)(f). 
42
 Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 497; see also Kvočka Trial Judgment, supra note 40, at para. 
141; Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20, Judgment & Sentence at para. 343 (May 15, 2003) 
[hereinafter Semanza Trial Judgment]. 
43
 Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 6, at para. 594; see also Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al., Case No. IT-96-21, 
Judgment at para. 494 (Nov. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Čelebići Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case 
No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment at para. 162 (Dec. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Furundzija Trial Judgment]. 
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official or with the consent of an official or a person acting in an official capacity.44  This 
element comes from the Torture Convention, which is an instrument that reflects customary 
international law with regard to State obligations.  It does not, as the Appeals Chamber stated 
in Foca reflect the definition of torture for individual responsibility outside of the framework 
of the Torture Convention.45  Subsequent cases have followed Foca and held that torture does 
not have an official actor requirement.46   
a. Rape as Torture 
As noted above rape can constitute torture as a crime against humanity when the 
elements of torture are satisfied.  In Foca, the Trial Chamber convicted two of the accused of 
torture based on their involvement in the rapes of several women.  The Trial Chamber found 
that Kunarac acted for prohibited purposes when he raped his victims.  He acted to 
discriminate, selecting his victims because of their ethnicity,47 to obtain a confession from 
one victim about allegedly sending messages to the Muslim forces, to obtain information 
regarding the location of valuables, and to intimidate.48  The Trial Chamber convicted 
Kunarac of torture after finding that the rapes resulted in severe mental and physical pain and 
suffering for the victims.  Kunarac’s co-accused, Vukovic was also convicted of torture based 
on acts of rape.  The Trial Chamber concluded that he acted to discriminate against the victim 
because of her ethnicity.  Vukovic argued that even if it was proven that he raped witness 
FSW-50, it was done out of sexual urge, not hatred, such that the prohibited purpose mens 
rea requirement for torture was not met.  The Trial Chamber rejected this argument.49 
b. Torture and Official Capacity 
The Foca, Kvočka, and Semanza convictions for torture based on acts of rape utilized 
the later definition of torture, which does not require the accused to be an official or acting at 
                                                
44
 Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 496. 
45
 Foca Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, at para. 148 (“the public official requirement is not a requirement 
under customary international law in relation to the criminal responsibility of an individual for torture outside of 
the framework of the Torture Convention”). 
46
 See, e.g., Kvočka Trial Judgment, supra note 40, at para. 141; Semanza Trial Judgment, supra note 42, at para. 
343.  But see Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9/2, Sentencing Judgment at para. 12 (Oct. 17, 2002) 
[hereinafter Simic Sentencing Judgment]. 
47 Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 654 (“The treatment reserved by Dragoljub Kunarac for his 
victims was motivated by their being Muslims, as is evidenced by the occasions when the accused told women, 
that they would give birth to Serb babies, or that they should ‘enjoy being fucked by a Serb.’”). 
48
 Id. at paras. 669, 711. 
49
 See supra text accompanying notes 56-59 for a discussion of the Trial Chamber’s response to Vukovic’s 
argument. 
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the instigation of or with the consent of an official or a person acting in an official capacity.50  
In this respect the definition of torture applied in these cases more closely matches that which 
is outlined in the ICC Elements of Crimes for torture as a crime against humanity. 
c. Prohibited Purpose  
 The elements of torture utilized by the ad hoc tribunals include a requirement that the 
act be committed for a prohibited purpose.  The Foca Trial Chamber defined torture as the 
intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, physical or mental, aimed at “obtaining 
information or a confession, or at punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third 
person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person.”51  The Trial 
Chamber stated that there is no requirement that the conduct must be committed solely for a 
prohibited purpose.  For the prohibited purpose element to be satisfied the Prosecutor must 
show that the prohibited purpose was part of the motivation behind the conduct; it does not 
have to be the “predominating or sole purpose.”52  This approach was subsequently followed 
by the Trial Chambers in Kvočka and Semanza.53 
In several rape as torture cases Trial Chambers at the ad hoc tribunals have found 
discrimination to be the prohibited purpose because the victims were selected as a result of 
their ethnicity.  The Foca Trial Chamber found that the deliberate selection of Muslim 
victims constituted discrimination.54  In Semanza, the Trial Chamber found that by 
encouraging a crowd to rape women because of their ethnicity the accused encouraged the 
infliction of pain and suffering for discriminatory purposes.55 
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 See Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at paras. 496-97; Kvočka Trial Judgment, supra note 40, at para. 
137-41; Semanza Trial Judgment, supra note 42, at para. 342.  
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 Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 497. 
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 Foca Trial Judgment at para. 486 (“There is no requirement under customary international law that the 
conduct must be solely perpetrated for one of the prohibited purposes. As was stated by the Trial Chamber 
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 Kvočka Trial Judgment at para. 140-41 (“The Trial Chamber also agrees with the Čelebići Trial Chamber that 
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 Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at paras. 669, 711. 
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d. Intent, Torture, and Rape 
The Foca Appeals Chamber made an important holding regarding the intent of an 
accused charged with torture as a crime against humanity for acts of rape.  Vukovic argued 
before the Trial Chamber that even if it was proven that he raped FSW-50, it was done out of 
sexual urge, not hatred.  Thus, the prohibited purpose mens rea requirement for torture was 
not met.  The Trial Chamber rejected this argument stating: 
The prohibited purpose need only be part of the motivation behind the conduct 
and need not be the predominant or sole purpose. The Trial Chamber has no 
doubt that it was at least a predominant purpose, as the accused obviously 
intended to discriminate against the group of which his victim was a member, 
i.e. the Muslims, and against his victim in particular.56 
  
This holding was upheld on appeal.  The Appeals Chamber stated: 
The Appeals Chamber holds that, even if the perpetrator’s motivation is 
entirely sexual, it does not follow that the perpetrator does not have the intent 
to commit an act of torture or that his conduct does not cause severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, since such pain or suffering is a likely 
and logical consequence of his conduct. In view of the definition, it is 
important to establish whether a perpetrator intended to act in a way which, in 
the normal course of events, would cause severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, to his victims.57 
 
The Appeals Chamber stated that the Prosecutor must establish whether the perpetrator 
intended to act in such a way that in the normal course of events would cause severe pain and 
suffering.58  The Foca defendants were found to have intended to act in such a way—
committing rape—so as to cause severe pain and suffering and because they acted in 
pursuance of a prohibited purpose—discrimination—their conviction for torture based on 
rape was upheld.59 
e. Pain and Suffering 
The Foca Appeals Chamber also had to address an argument from one of the accused 
convicted of torture based on rape that a victim’s pain and suffering must be visible, even 
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 Foca Trial Judgment, supra note 25, at para. 816. 
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 Foca Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, at para. 153. 
58
 Id.  
59
 Id.  
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long after the commission of the crime.60  The Appeals Chamber dismissed this argument as 
erroneous and stated that  
[g]enerally speaking, some acts establish per se the suffering of those upon 
whom they were inflicted.  Rape is obviously such an act.  The Trial Chamber 
could only conclude that such suffering occurred even without a medical 
certificate.  Sexual violence necessarily gives rise to severe pain or suffering 
whether physical or medical, and in this way justifies its characterisation as 
an act of torture.61 
The pain and suffering requirement for torture is satisfied once rape has been proven because 
rape “necessarily implies such pain or suffering.”62  Additional mental suffering is caused 
when a perpetrator forces people to watch a rape being committed.  In Kvočka the Trial 
Chamber found that the “presence of onlookers, particularly family members, also inflicts 
severe mental harm amounting to torture on the person being raped.”63  In 1998, the 
Furundzija Trial Chamber held that being forced to watch acquaintances being victimized in 
severe sexual attacks was torture for the forced observer.64  
f. Other Acts of Sexual Violence as Torture 
In 2002, Milan Simic pled guilty to torture as a crime against humanity and acts of 
sexual violence formed the basis for the plea.  Simic kicked four individuals in their genitals 
and repeatedly pulled down the pants of an individual he was beating and threatened to cut of 
his penis.65  Simic acknowledged that the Prosecutor would have shown that these acts 
inflicted severe mental or physical pain or suffering and that they were committed “for the 
purpose of punishing, intimidating or humiliating the victims with discriminatory intent.”66 
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 Id. (emphasis added).    In 2001, the Kvočka Trial Chamber referenced the work of the UN Special Rapporteur 
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3. Rape 
Rape is enumerated as a crime against humanity in Article 5(g) of the ICTY Statute 
and Article 3(g) of the ICTR Statute.  The Rome Statue similarly lists rape as a crime against 
humanity in Article 7(g); however, the Rome Statue goes further and also states that sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of 
sexual violence of comparable gravity are also crimes against humanity.67  The ad hoc 
tribunals have addressed these and other acts of sexual violence within the “other inhumane 
acts” category of crimes against humanity.  Part III(B)(5) below discusses that jurisprudence. 
The elements for the crime against humanity of rape according to the ICC Elements of 
Crimes are as follows: 
1.  The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in 
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of 
the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of 
the victim with any object or any other part of the body. 
 
2.  The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, 
such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, 
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or 
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or 
the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving 
genuine consent. 
 
3.  The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against a civilian population. 
 
4.  The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the 
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
a civilian population.68 
 
The definition of rape before the ad hoc tribunals has evolved in cases that charged 
rape as a crime against humanity and as a war crime.  To accurately portray the evolution of 
this jurisprudence this section discusses cases in which rape was charged as a crime against 
humanity and as a war crime.  The difference between these two charges relates to the 
specific elements that must be established for crimes against humanity and for war crimes.  
For example, crimes against humanity must be part of a widespread and systematic attack 
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 Rome Statute at art. 7(g). 
68
 ICC Elements of Crimes at art. 7(1)(g)-1.  Footnotes within this article specify that the “concept of ‘invasion’ 
is intended to be broad enough to be gender-neutral” and that “It is understood that a person may be incapable of 
giving genuine consent if affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity. This footnote also applies to the 
corresponding elements of article 7 (1) (g)-3, 5 and 6.”   
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while war crimes must be closely linked to an armed conflict and the victims must be 
protected persons.69   
The Trial Chamber in Akayesu defined rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, 
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.”70  In adopting this 
definition the Trial Chamber noted that “rape is a form of aggression and that the central 
elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and 
body parts.”71  Several months later the Trial Chamber in Čelebići applied the same 
definition,72 but the Trial Chamber in Furundzija applied a definition that focuses more on 
the “mechanical description of objects and body parts” just one month after the Čelebići 
judgment was issued.73  In Furundzija rape is defined as: 
(i) the sexual penetration, however slight: 
 
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the 
perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or 
 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 
 
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third 
person.74  
 
The different approaches used in Akayesu and Furundzija were discussed in Musema and the 
Musema Trial Chamber noted that Akayesu adopts a conceptual approach while Furundzija 
utilizes a mechanical definition.  The Musema Trial Chamber concluded that the conceptual 
approach of Akayesu was preferable to the definition set forth in Furundzija because of the 
“dynamic ongoing evolution of the understanding of rape and the incorporation of this 
understanding into principles of international law.”75  The Akayesu definition “clearly 
encompasses all the conduct” described in the Furundzija definition and such an approach 
was deemed to be better for accommodating evolving norms of criminal justice.76 
The focus on coercion and force in the Furundzija definition was directly challenged 
in Foca.  The Foca Trial Chamber held that the Furundzija definition was “more narrowly 
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stated than required by international law.”77  The Foca Trial Chamber concluded that lack of 
voluntary consent was the key aspect of rape.  Therefore in requiring the sexual penetration to 
take place by coercion, force, or threat of force, the Furundzija Trial Chamber did “not refer 
to other factors that would render an act of sexual penetration non-consensual or non-
voluntary on the part of the victim.”78  Therefore the Foca Trial Chamber adopted the 
following definition of rape: 
the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim 
by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or  
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such 
sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim.  Consent for this 
purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, 
assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the 
intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs 
without the consent of the victim.79 
The Foca Appeals Chamber concurred with this definition and it has been applied by the 
Trial Chambers in Kvočka, Kamuhanda, Semanza, Stakic, Nikolic, Kajelijeli, Gacumbitsi, and 
Muhimana.80  The ICC Elements of Crimes similarly uses a more mechanical definition, but 
it does require the sexual penetration to occur by force, threat of force, or coercion, by taking 
advantage of a coercive environment, or against a person incapable of giving genuine 
consent.  Thus the ICC definition covers a range of ways in which sexual penetration can be 
non-consensual. 
The Kvočka Trial Chamber stated that rape is a “violation of sexual autonomy,” and 
the Foca definition of rape focuses on sexual autonomy and various ways in which it can be 
violated.81  In order for sexual activity to constitute rape it must fall within one of the 
following two categories: 
(i)  the sexual activity must be accompanied by force or threat of force to 
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 Kvočka Trial Judgment, supra note 40, at para. 177; Kamuhanda Trial Judgment, supra note 9, at para. 495-
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the victim or a third party; 
 
(ii)  the sexual activity must be accompanied by force or a variety of other 
specified circumstances which made the victim particularly vulnerable 
or negated her ability to make an informed refusal; or the sexual 
activity must occur without the consent of the victim.82 
 
The mens rea requirement for rape is “the intent to effect a sexual penetration and the 
knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.”83 
 While the Foca definition is more “mechanical” than the Akayesu definition, the 
Muhimana Trial Chamber stated that the Akayesu and Foca definitions of rape are not 
incompatible and it endorsed “the conceptual definition of rape established in Akayesu, which 
encompasses the elements set out in Kunarac [Foca].”84 
a. Evidence of Resistance 
 The accused in Foca appealed their rape convictions contending that the definition of 
rape adopted by the Trial Chamber did not include two necessary elements.  One, that the 
sexual penetration took place by force or threat of force, and two that the victim’s resistance 
was continuous or genuine.85  On the first point, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial 
Chamber’s definition, which does not require the use or threat of force, but instead requires 
voluntary consent.86  On the second point, the Appellants argued that “nothing short of 
continuous resistance provides adequate notice to the perpetrator that his attentions are 
unwanted.”87  The Appeals Chamber rejected this argument finding it “wrong on the law and 
absurd on the facts.”88  The Appeals Chamber in Kvočka similarly rejected a request by an 
appellant to require a showing of “permanent and lasting resistance” by the victim and 
“simultaneous use of force or threat.”89 
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b. Consent 
 The Foca Appeals Chamber stated that the Foca Trial Judgment did not “disavow the 
Tribunal’s earlier jurisprudence,” but rather sought to explain the relationship between force 
and consent.90  The Appeals Chamber clarified that 
there are “factors ‘other than force’ which would render an act of sexual 
penetration non-consensual or non-voluntary on the part of the victim”.  A 
narrow focus on force or threat of force could permit perpetrators to evade 
liability for sexual activity to which the other party had not consented by 
taking advantage of coercive circumstances without relying on physical 
force.91 
The Appeals Chamber went on to note that the circumstances giving rise to rape charges as 
crimes against humanity or war crimes “will be almost universally coercive” such that “true 
consent will not be possible.”92  The Trial Chambers in both Čelebići and Furundzija made 
similar findings.93   
4. Persecution 
Persecution is a crime against humanity within the jurisdiction of the ICC, ICTY, and 
ICTR based on Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute, Article 5(h) of the ICTY Statute, and 
Article 3(h) of the ICTR Statute.  The ICC Elements of Crimes defines the elements of 
persecution as follows:  
1.  The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, one or 
more persons of fundamental rights. 
 
2.  The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the 
identity of a group or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity 
as such. 
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3.  Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, of the Statute, or 
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law. 
 
4.  The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in 
article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute or any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
5.  The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against a civilian population. 
 
6.  The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the 
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
a civilian population. 
 
 Persecution before the ad hoc tribunals has an additional element—it must be 
committed with an intent to discriminate on political, racial, or religious grounds.  A footnote 
to Article 7(1)(h)(4) of the ICC Elements of Crimes suggests that this element does not exist 
before the ICC, stating that “[i]t is understood that no additional mental element is necessary 
for this element other than that inherent in element 6.94 
 The Trial Chamber in Kupreskić held that persecution is “the gross or blatant denial, 
on discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or 
treaty law, reaching the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5 [crimes 
against humanity].”95  Other courts have included murder, extermination, torture, 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, rape, and other serious acts like those enumerated in 
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute as underlying acts for persecution.96   
This definition evolved over time and the Trial Chamber in Stakic restated the “settled 
definition” of persecution as an act or omission that “1. discriminates in fact and which 
denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in customary international or treaty 
law (the actus reus); and 2. was carried out deliberately with the intent to discriminate on 
political, racial and religious grounds (mens rea).”97   
There have been several ICTY cases in which accused have been charged and 
convicted of persecution based on rape and acts of sexual violence.  For example, Steven 
Todorović pled guilty to one count of persecution and the underlying acts supporting this 
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charge included sexual assaults on Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims detained in various 
detention camps in and around the Bosanksi Šamac municipality.98  General Radislav Krstić 
was charged with persecution based on the cruel and inhumane treatment of Bosnian Muslim 
civilians.  The cruel and inhumane treatment consisted of severe beatings, lack of food and 
water, rape, and killings.99  The Trial Chamber found Krstić liable for the murders, rapes, 
beatings, and abuses that took place within what they determined to be a criminal enterprise 
at Potočari.100  Biljana Plavsic pled guilty to persecution and the underlying acts were cruel or 
inhumane treatment, which consisted of acts of sexual violence that took place in Zvornik at 
the Ekonomija farm and the Čelopek camp.101  In Stakic, the Trial Chamber found that acts of 
sexual assault and rape were committed and these acts supported the persecution charge.102  
Nikolic pled guilty to persecution and the underlying acts supporting this conviction were 
sexual violence and aiding and abetting rape.  Nikolic had been separately charged with 
sexual violence and aiding and abetting rape but he entered a guilty plea to persecution, 
which the Plea Agreement stated was based on the acts individually charged in the 
indictment.103  
 The Trial Chamber in Kvočka held that sexual violence can constitute persecution 
when it is committed with the requisite discriminatory intent, yet discriminatory intent will 
not have to be shown for a successful persecution conviction at the ICC.104  
5. Other inhumane acts 
Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction over “other inhumane 
acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health.”  The ICC Elements of Crimes states that the elements for other 
inhumane acts are as follows: 
1.  The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act. 
 
2.  Such act was of a character similar to any other act referred to in article 
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7, paragraph 1, of the Statute. 
 
3.  The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established 
the character of the act. 
 
4.  The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against a civilian population. 
 
5.  The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the 
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
a civilian population. 
 
Other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity are within the ad hoc tribunals’ 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5(i) of the ICTY Statute and Article 3(i) of the ICTR Statute.  
The Kayishema Trial Chamber has stated that in relation to the ICTR Statute other inhumane 
acts include those  
that are of similar gravity and seriousness to the enumerated acts of murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or 
persecution on political, racial and religious grounds.  These will be acts or 
omissions that deliberately cause serious mental or physical suffering or injury 
or constitute a serious attack on human dignity.105 
Furthermore there must be a “nexus between the inhumane act and the great suffering or 
serious injury to mental or physical health of the victim.”106  Other inhumane acts must be 
committed deliberately.   
[An] accused may be held liable under these circumstances only where, at the 
time of the act, the accused had the intention to inflict serious mental suffering 
on the third party, or where the accused knew that his act was likely to cause 
serious mental suffering and was reckless as to whether such suffering would 
result.107 
The Bagilishema Trial Chamber utilized the same definition of other inhumane acts.108  Both 
chambers stated that whether a specific act falls within the category of other inhumane acts is 
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a decision that must be made on a case-by-case basis.109  Applying the Kayishema definition 
of other inhumane acts, the Niyitegeka Trial Chamber found the Accused guilty of other 
inhumane acts for two acts of sexual violence.110  The Accused rejoiced when an individual 
was killed, decapitated, and castrated.  The victim’s skull was pierced through the ears with a 
spike and his genitals were hung on the spike in public view.111  The Accused also ordered 
Interahamwe to undress the body of a recently shot Tutsi woman, to sharpen a piece of wood, 
and to insert the wood into her genitalia.112  The Trial Chamber concluded that these acts are 
“acts of seriousness comparable to other acts enumerated in the Article, and would cause 
mental suffering to civilians, in particular, Tutsi civilians, and constitute a serious attack on 
the human dignity of the Tutsi community as a whole.”113  
 The Trial Chamber in Kajelijeli applied the Kayishema definition of other inhumane 
acts and concluded that  
[c]utting a woman’s breast off and licking it, and piercing a woman’s sexual 
organs with a spear are nefarious acts of a comparable gravity to the other acts 
listed as crimes against humanity, which would clearly cause great mental 
suffering to any members of the Tutsi community who observed them.114 
While the accused was not convicted for these acts, the case provides an example of the types 
of acts that the ad hoc tribunals have found to constitute other inhumane acts.115  Other 
examples of sexual violence that have been found to constitute other inhumane acts are 
forcing prisoners to perform oral sexual acts on each other, forcing a prisoner to bite off the 
testicle of another prisoner,116  the forced undressing of a woman outside in a public area 
after making her sit in mud, the forced undressing and public marching of a woman in a 
public area, and the forced undressing of women and making them perform physical 
exercises in a public area naked.117 
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 As noted above, the Rome Statute enumerates more sexual violence crimes than the 
ICTY and ICTR Statutes and Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute covers “any other form of 
sexual violence of comparable gravity.”  Consequently acts of sexual violence that are not 
specifically enumerated in the Rome Statute may have to be charged as Article 7(1)(g) 
crimes, rather than Article 7(1)(k) (other inhumane acts) crimes.  The Statute for the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone is similar to the Rome Statute and Article 2(g) grants the Special 
Court jurisdiction over “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and 
any other form of sexual violence.”118  In a May 2005 decision, the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (“SCSL”) held that other acts of sexual violence must be charged as Article 2(g) 
crimes and not as Article 2(i) (other inhumane acts) crimes.  The Trial Chamber in the Civil 
Defence Forces (“CDF”) case held that  
in light of the separate and distinct residual category of sexual offenses under 
Article 2(g), it is impermissible to allege acts of sexual violence (other than 
rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy) under Article 
2(i) [other inhumane acts] since ‘other inhumane acts’, even if residual, must 
logically be restrictively interpreted as covering only acts of a non-sexual 
nature amounting to an affront to human dignity.119 
The Trial Chamber concluded that the  
clear legislative intent behind the statutory formula “any other form of sexual 
violence” in Article 2(g) is the creation of a category of offenses of sexual 
violence of a character that do not amount to any of the earlier enumerated 
sexual crimes, and that to permit such other forms of sexual violence to be 
charged under “other inhumane acts” offends the rule against multiplicity and 
uncertainty.120 
The SCSL was faced with this issue because the CDF indictment charged the accused with 
other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity, but did not charge them with violations of 
Article 2(g).  The indictment did not mention acts of sexual violence and the Chamber denied 
the Prosecutor’s motion to amend the indictment to add Article 2(g) charges for sexual 
violence.  In light of this denial the Prosecutor sought leave to introduce evidence of sexual 
violence under the Article 2(i) (other inhumane acts) charge.  This motion was denied.  The 
Trial Chamber concluded that the defendants did not have adequate notice that they would 
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have to address acts of sexual violence because such acts were not mentioned in the 
indictment.121  In a separate concurring opinion the presiding judge, Judge Itoe, stated that “a 
failure to plead in the Indictment, material facts and elements of offenses which the 
Prosecution intends to rely on to prove it, renders it vague, unspecific, and defective.”122  The 
Chamber concluded that  
nothing in the record seems to support the Prosecution’s assertion that the 
evidentiary material under reference had been disclosed to the Defence “in 
some form” over 12 months ago and even if there were, there is nothing in the 
Consolidated Indictment, the principal accusatory instrument, to sustain such 
an assertion.123 
The Trial Chamber’s insistence that the indictment provide notice as to the specific acts 
giving rise to the other inhumane acts charge is contrary to the jurisprudence of the ICTY and 
ICTR.  The indictment in Kayishema did not specify the acts, or the nature of the acts, that 
the Prosecutor relied upon for the other inhumane acts charge.124  The Trial Chamber 
concluded that it was therefore “incumbent upon the Prosecution to rectify the vagueness of 
the counts during its presentation of evidence.”125  Citing Blaskic, the Trial Chamber noted, 
“[i]ndeed the question of knowing whether the allegations appearing in the Indictment are 
vague will, in the final analysis, be settled at Trial.”126 
 The SCSL’s decision has two implications for the ICC.  The first is that acts of sexual 
violence may have to be charged as Article 7(1)(g) crimes and not “other inhumane acts.”  
The second is what means are available for the Prosecutor to give accused adequate notice of 
the underlying acts relied upon for the charges in the indictment.  The ICC will have to 
decide whether those acts have to be specified in the indictment as held by the SCSL or 
whether the Prosecutor can provide the necessary details during the course of the trial as held 
by the ICTY and ICTR. 
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C. War Crimes 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction over war crimes.  Article 
8(2)(a) addresses grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (“Geneva 
Conventions), Article 8(2)(b) covers “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in international armed conflict,” Article 8(2)(c) deals with serious violations of 
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for non-international 
armed conflicts, and Article 8(2)(e) covers “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character.” 
The ad hoc tribunals’ jurisdictional mandate similarly covers war crimes.  Article 2 of 
the ICTY Statute grants the ICTY jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions.  Article 3 states that the “International Tribunal shall have the power to 
prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war.”  The Tadic Appeals Chamber held 
that Article 3 “functions as a residual clause designed to ensure that no serious violation of 
international humanitarian law is taken away from the jurisdiction of the International 
Tribunal.”127  Thus violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (“Common 
Article 3”), which are not specifically mentioned in the ICTY Statute, are within the ICTY’s 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3.128 
Article 4 of the ICTR Statute grants the ICTR jurisdiction over serious violations of 
Common Article 3 and of Additional Protocol II of 8 June 1977.  The grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions only apply to international conflicts therefore the ICTR does not have 
jurisdiction over grave breaches. 
Acts of sexual violence have been charged as various war crimes, such as torture 
pursuant to Articles 2(b) and 3 of the ICTY Statute and Article 4(a) of the ICTR Statute, cruel 
treatment pursuant to Article 3 of the ICTY Statute and Article 4(a) of the ICTR Statute, 
outrages upon personal dignity pursuant to Article 3 of the ICTY Statute and Article 4(e) of 
the ICTR Statute, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health 
pursuant to Article 2(c) of the ICTY Statute, and inhuman treatment based on Article 2(b) of 
the ICTY Statute. 
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1. Torture 
The ICC has jurisdiction over torture as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions 
and as a serious violation of Common Article 3.  The ICC Elements of Crimes lists the 
elements for torture as a grave breach as follows: 
1. The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering 
upon one or more persons. 
 
2. The perpetrator inflicted the pain or suffering for such purposes as: 
obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation or 
coercion or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind. 
 
3.  Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
 
4.  The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established 
that protected status. 
 
5.  The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an 
international armed conflict. 
 
6.  The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict.129 
 
The ICTY Statute, but not the ICTR Statute, grants the ICTY jurisdiction over grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions.  As can be seen by element five noted above, grave breaches 
must take place within the context of an international conflict.  As the conflict in Rwanda was 
internal, the ICTY provides the only jurisprudence on grave breaches.  There has been one 
significant ICTY case in which acts of sexual violence have been charged as grave breaches 
and convictions were obtained—Čelebići.  In Čelebići the accused were charged with torture, 
inhuman treatment, and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health 
for rapes and acts of sexual violence.  The elements of torture as a grave breach before the 
ICTY are as follows: 
(i)  There must be an act or omission that causes severe pain or suffering, 
whether mental or physical, 
 
(ii)  which is inflicted intentionally, 
 
(iii)  and for such purposes as obtaining information or a confession from 
the victim, or a third person, punishing the victim for an act he or she 
                                                
129
 ICC Elements of Crimes at art. 8(2)(a)(ii)-1. 
34 
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, 
intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or for any reason 
based on discrimination of any kind, 
 
and such act or omission being committed by, or at the instigation of, or with 
the consent or acquiescence of, an official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.130 
 
As noted in the discussion of torture as a crime against humanity, the official actor 
requirement is now understood to be limited to prosecutions pursuant to the Torture 
Convention.  As a grave breach, there is the additional requirement that the acts take place 
within the context of an armed conflict and that the victims be protected persons under the 
Geneva Conventions.131 
Pursuant to the ICC Elements of Crimes torture is a serious violation of Common 
Article 3 when: 
1.  The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering 
upon one or more persons. 
 
2.  The perpetrator inflicted the pain or suffering for such purposes as: 
obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation or 
coercion or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind. 
 
3.  Such person or persons were either hors de combat, or were civilians, 
medical personnel or religious personnel taking no active part in the 
hostilities. 
 
4.  The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established 
this status. 
 
5.  The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an 
armed conflict not of an international character. 
 
6.  The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict. 
 
The jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals establishes that the elements of torture as a serious 
violation of Common Article 3 of are as follows: 
(i)  The infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental. 
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(ii)  The act or omission must be intentional. 
 
The act or omission must aim at obtaining information or a confession, or at 
punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or at 
discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person.132   
 
As with torture as a crime against humanity, the early ad hoc tribunal cases required that the 
perpetrator be an official or that the perpetrator act “at the instigation of, or with the consent 
or acquiescence of, an official or other person acting in an official capacity.”133  The 2001 
Foca holding, which was upheld by the Appeals Chamber in 2002,134 stating that pursuant to 
customary international law, the elements of torture do not include an official actor 
requirement is equally applicable to torture as a crime against humanity, a grave breach of the 
Geneva Conventions and a serious violation of Common Article 3.135 
a. Rape as Torture 
 As with torture as a crime against humanity, the ad hoc tribunals have concluded that 
rape and other acts of sexual violence can constitute torture as a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions or a serious violation of Common Article 3 if the elements of torture are 
satisfied.136  As noted by the Furundzija Trial Chamber, 
Rape is resorted to either by the interrogator himself or by other persons 
associated with the interrogation of a detainee, as a means of punishing, 
intimidating, coercing or humiliating the victim, or obtaining information, or a 
confession, from the victim or a third person. In human rights law, in such 
situations the rape may amount to torture, as demonstrated by the finding of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Aydin and the Inter-American Court 
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of Human Rights in Meijia.137   
Čelebići was the first case in which an accused was convicted of torture for committing rape.  
The Trial Chamber concluded that Delic’s rape of Grozdana Cecez constituted torture 
because it caused Cecez to suffer severe mental pain and suffering, the rape was intentional, 
and the rape was committed for several prohibited purposes.  It was later held in Foca that 
once rape has been proven, the pain and suffering element of torture has also been proven.138   
The Čelebići Trial Chamber found that because Cecez lived “in a state of constant 
fear and depression, suicidal tendencies, and exhaustion, both mental and physical,” there 
could be no question that she suffered severe mental pain and suffering.139  This Trial 
Chamber also found that the “acts of vaginal penetration by the penis under circumstances 
that were coercive, quite clearly constitute rape” and that they were committed 
intentionally.140  The prohibited purposes included obtaining information about the 
whereabouts of the victim’s husband, punishing the victim for failing to provide the requested 
information, coercing the victim to provide the desired information, punishing the victim for 
her husband’s alleged actions,141 intimidating the victim and other inmates in the prison-camp 
where the rape took place,142 and finally discrimination because the specific violent act 
committed—rape—was chosen because of the victim’s gender.143 
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In Furundzija the rape of Witness A constituted torture because the accused 
intentionally raped Witness A to obtain information.  The accused also forced Witness D to 
watch the sexual attack of Witness A in order to obtain information about his alleged betrayal 
of the Croatian Defence Council and his assistance to Witness A and her children.  The Trial 
Chamber concluded that this constituted torture.  Forcing Witness D to “watch sexual attacks 
on a woman, in particular, a woman whom he knew as a friend, caused him severe physical 
and mental suffering” and the act was committed for a prohibited purpose.144 
b. Mens rea 
 The Foca Appeals Chamber holdings regarding intent and torture are equally 
applicable for torture as a crime against humanity, a grave breach, and a serious violation of 
Common Article 3.  Thus  
even if the perpetrator’s motivation is entirely sexual, it does not follow that 
the perpetrator does not have the intent to commit an act of torture or that his 
conduct does not cause severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, 
since such pain or suffering is a likely and logical consequence of his conduct. 
In view of the definition, it is important to establish whether a perpetrator 
intended to act in a way which, in the normal course of events, would cause 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, to his victims.145 
2. Cruel treatment 
Cruel treatment as a serious violation of Common Article 3 is within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute.  The elements stated in the ICC 
Elements of Crimes are as follows: 
1.  The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering 
upon one or more persons. 
 
2.  Such person or persons were either hors de combat, or were civilians, 
medical personnel, or religious personnel taking no active part in the 
hostilities. 
 
3.  The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established 
this status. 
 
4.  The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an 
armed conflict not of an international character.146 
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The ad hoc tribunals’ jurisdiction over this crime is based on Article 3 of the ICTY Statute 
and Article 4(a) of the ICTR Statute.  Cruel treatment as outlined by the ad hoc tribunals 
consists of:  
1. an intentional act or omission,   
  
2. that is deliberate and not accidental,  
 
3. which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or 
constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.147 
 
There have been three significant cases in which acts of sexual violence have been charged as 
cruel treatment as a serious violation of Common Article 3.  These cases are Čelebići, Simic, 
and Semanza.   
In Čelebići Mucic was convicted of cruel treatment for his role in tying an electric 
cord around the genitals of prisoners and forcing prisoners to perform fellatio on one 
another.148  Delic, another accused in Čelebići, was acquitted of cruel treatment for the rape 
of Grozdana Cecez because it was included as a lesser offense to torture as a grave breach of 
the Geneva Conventions and torture as a serious violation of Common Article 3, both of 
which he was convicted.149 
Simic was charged with cruel treatment for kicking four individuals in their genitals 
and repeatedly pulling down the pants of one individual while he beat him and threatening to 
cut off his penis.150  Simic pled guilty, but only to the torture as a crime against humanity 
charges.151 
In Semanza the facts that gave rise to the cruel treatment charge were the same facts 
underlying the charges of rape as a crime against humanity and torture as a crime against 
humanity.  Two of the three judges in the Trial Chamber found sufficient evidence to 
conclude that Semanza was responsible for the rape of Victim A and Victim B.  Thus 
convictions on the rape as a crime against humanity and torture as a crime against humanity 
charges were entered.  One of the two judges concluded, however, that it would be 
“impermissible to convict on Count 13 [cruel treatment] because of the apparent ideal 
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39 
concurrence of the crime charged therein with rape, torture, and murder as crimes against 
humanity charged in Counts 10, 11, and 12.”152  This conclusion was overturned on appeal.   
Cumulative convictions under different statutory provisions for the same conduct are 
permissible if the statutory provisions have materially distinct elements that are not contained 
in the other.153  “An element is materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact 
not required by the other.”154  The Semanza Appeals Chamber concluded that the Trial 
Chamber’s failure to enter a conviction for the cruel treatment count was an error.  The 
Appeals Chamber concluded that Semanza’s “convictions for crimes against humanity 
necessitated proof of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, whereas 
convictions for war crimes require that the offences charged be closely related to the armed 
conflict.”155  The Appeals Chamber noted that the Trial Chamber found the necessary nexus 
was established such that the necessary elements of the crimes against humanity and the 
serious violations of Common Article 3 were established.  To remedy the Trial Chamber’s 
error, the Appeals Chamber entered a conviction for Count 13 (cruel treatment) of the 
indictment.156 
3. Outrages upon personal dignity 
The ICC has jurisdiction over outrages upon personal dignity, including humiliating 
and degrading treatment as a serious violation of Common Article 3 based on Article 
8(2)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute.  The elements of this crime are: 
1.  The perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the dignity 
of one or more persons.* 
 
2.  The severity of the humiliation, degradation or other violation was of 
such degree as to be generally recognized as an outrage upon personal 
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dignity. 
 
3.  Such person or persons were either hors de combat, or were civilians, 
medical personnel or religious personnel taking no active part in the 
hostilities. 
 
4.  The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established 
this status. 
 
5.  The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an 
armed conflict not of an international character. 
 
6.  The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict. 
 
Outrages upon personal dignity are within the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisdiction pursuant to 
Article 3 of the ICTY Statute and Article 4(e) of the ICTR Statute.  The ICTR Statute 
specifically grants jurisdiction over “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.”157  
The ICTY’s jurisdiction over this crime is based on Common Article 3, which prohibits 
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”158  
While the ICTR included “rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault” 
within the outrages upon personal dignity category, the Rome Statute enumerates these and 
other acts of sexual violence separately in Article 8(2)(e)(vi).  This article grants the ICC 
jurisdiction over “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, . . . enforced 
sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of 
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.”159 
 The elements for establishing outrages upon personal dignity before the ad hoc 
tribunals are  
1. that the accused intentionally committed or participated in an act or 
omission which would be generally considered to cause serious 
humiliation, degradation or otherwise be a serious attack on human 
dignity, and  
 
2.  that he knew that the act or omission could have that effect.160 
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The Foca Appeals Chamber affirmed this definition rejecting the appellant’s contention that 
the Trial Chamber should have provided a list of acts that constitute an outrage upon personal 
dignity and that the appropriate mens rea requirement is that the perpetrator knew his act or 
omission would cause serious humiliation, degradation or otherwise be a serious attack on 
human dignity.161   
An earlier ICTY case stated that with regard to outrages upon personal dignity  
[i]t is not necessary for the act to directly harm the physical or mental well-
being of the victim.  It is enough that the act causes real and lasting suffering 
to the individual arising from the humiliation or ridicule.  The degree of 
suffering which the victim endures will obviously depend on his/her 
temperament.162 
The Foca Trial Chamber took issue with this aspect of the definition, stating  
the Trial Chamber would not agree with any indication from the passage 
above that this humiliation or degradation must cause “lasting suffering” to the 
victim.  So long as the humiliation or degradation is real and serious, the Trial 
Chamber can see no reason why it would also have to be “lasting”.  In the 
view of the Trial Chamber, it is not open to regard the fact that a victim has 
recovered or is overcoming the effects of such an offence as indicating of 
itself that the relevant acts did not constitute an outrage upon personal dignity. 
Obviously, if the humiliation and suffering caused is only fleeting in nature, it 
may be difficult to accept that it is real and serious.  However this does not 
suggest that any sort of minimum temporal requirement of the effects of an 
outrage upon personal dignity is an element of the offence.163 
The Foca approach was followed by the Kvočka Trial Chamber.164 
 The acts that gave rise to the outrages upon personal dignity charge in Foca included 
holding four young women in an apartment and forcing them to dance naked on a table while 
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one of the accused watched, selling one woman to a man for 200 deutschmarks and another 
two women for 500 deutschmarks, and handing one woman over to two men.165  Rape and 
other acts of sexual violence were the basis for charges of outrages upon personal dignity in 
Kamuhanda, Semanza, and Cesic.  The Trial Chamber concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the charges in both Kamuhanda and Semanza.  Cesic pled guilty to 
humiliating and degrading treatment as a serious violation of Common Article 3 for forcing 
two Muslim detainees to perform fellatio on each other.166  Consequently these three cases do 
not address the elements of outrages upon personal dignity as a serious violation of Common 
Article 3. 
In Musema the Trial Chamber enumerated the elements of humiliating and degrading 
treatment pursuant to Article 4(e) of the ICTR Statute.  The elements include  
[s]ubjecting victims to treatment designed to subvert their self-regard.  Like 
outrages upon personal dignity, these offences may be regarded as a lesser 
forms [sic] of torture; moreover ones in which the motives required for torture 
would not be required, nor would it be required that the acts be committed 
under state authority.167 
The elements of rape as a crime against humanity are equally applicable for rape as an Article 
4(e) offense.168  Finally, indecent assault occurs when an individual causes “the infliction of 
pain or injury by an act which was of a sexual nature and inflicted by means of coercion, 
force, threat or intimidation and was non-consensual.”169 
a. Mens rea 
 On appeal the Appellant in Foca argued that the Prosecutor had not proven that he 
acted with the intention to humiliate his victims.  He argued that his “objective was of an 
exclusively sexual nature.”170  The Appeals Chamber rejected this argument concluding that 
“the Trial Chamber properly demonstrated that the crime of outrages upon personal dignity 
requires only . . . knowledge of the ‘possible’ consequences of the charged act or 
omission.”171  With regard to the facts at issue the Appeals Chamber stated, 
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[s]ince the nature of the acts committed by the Appellant against FWS-75, 
FWS-87, A.S. and A.B. undeniably reaches the objective threshold for the 
crime of outrages upon personal dignity set out in the Trial Judgement, the 
Trial Chamber correctly concluded that any reasonable person would have 
perceived his acts “to cause serious humiliation, degradation or otherwise be a 
serious attack on human dignity”.  Therefore, it appears highly improbable 
that the Appellant was not, at the very least, aware that his acts could have 
such an effect.172 
b. Rape173 
 The Foca Appeals Chamber holdings regarding force or threat of force and consent, 
which are discussed in Part III(B)(3) (rape as a crime against humanity) also apply to rape 
charges under outrages upon personal dignity as a serious violation of Common Article 3. 
4. Wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health  
Article 8(2)(a)(iii) grants the ICC jurisdiction over wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.  The ICC 
Elements of Crimes states that the elements for this offence are as follows: 
1.  The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or 
serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons. 
 
2.  Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
 
3.  The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established 
that protected status. 
 
4.  The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an 
international armed conflict. 
 
5.  The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict.174 
 
The ICTY has jurisdiction over this offense pursuant to Article 2(c) of the ICTY Statute, and 
because this is a grave breach that must take place within the context of an international 
armed conflict, the ICTR does not have jurisdiction over this offense.  The ICTY has held 
that wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health requires:  
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1. an intentional act or omission 
 
2 that, when judged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental,  
 
3. which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury.175 
 
As a grave breach the act must also take place within the context of an international armed 
conflict and the victim must be a protected person pursuant to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949.  Acts that qualify as “wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body 
or health” include acts that “do not meet the purposive requirements for the offence of 
torture.”176  The Čelebići Trial Chamber noted, however, that all acts that constitute torture 
also constitute wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.177  Mucic, 
one of the accused in Čelebići, was charged with wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health based on superior responsibility for placing a burning fuse cord 
around the genitals of Vukašin Mrkajic and Duško Bendo.178  The Trial Chamber found that 
“the intentional act of placing of a burning fuse cord against Vukašin Mrkajic’s bare body 
caused the victim such serious suffering and injury that it constitutes the offence of willfully 
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health under Article 2 . . . of the 
Statute.”179 
The offense of willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health as a 
grave breach is very similar to that of inhuman treatment as a grave breach.  The similarities 
and differences between the offenses will be discussed below. 
5. Inhuman Treatment 
The ICC has jurisdiction over inhuman treatment as a grave breach pursuant to Article 
8(2)(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute.  The ICC Elements of Crime state that inhuman treatment as 
a grave breach occurs when: 
1.  The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering 
upon one or more persons. 
 
2.  Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the 
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Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
 
3.  The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established 
that protected status. 
 
4.  The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an 
international armed conflict. 
 
5.  The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict.180 
 
The ICTY has jurisdiction over this offense pursuant to Article 2(b) of the ICTY Statute, and 
because this is a grave breach that must take place within the context of an international 
armed conflict, the ICTR does not have jurisdiction over this offense.  Inhuman treatment 
consists of: 
1. an intentional act or omission  
 
2 that, when judged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental,  
 
3. which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or 
constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.181 
 
As a grave breach the act must also take place within the context of an international armed 
conflict and the victim must be a protected person pursuant to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949.  All acts that constitute torture or willfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health also constitute inhuman treatment.182  Inhuman treatment extends 
beyond torture and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health to 
include acts that “violate the basic principle of humane treatment, particularly the respect for 
human dignity.”183  Recognizing the fact-specific nature of this offense, the Čelebići Trial 
Chamber concluded that “whether any particular act . . . is inconsistent with the principle of 
humane treatment, and thus constitutes inhuman(e) treatment, is a question of fact to be 
judged in all the circumstances of the particular case.”184 
 Mucic, one of the accused in Čelebići, was charged with inhuman treatment, based on 
superior responsibility, for forcing Vaso Dordic and Veseljko Dordic, Muslim brothers who 
were prisoners, to perform fellatio on one another for two to three minutes in full view of the 
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other detainees.185  The Trial Chamber concluded that this act “constituted, at least, a 
fundamental attack on their human dignity,” and thus constituted inhuman treatment under 
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute.186 
6. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence 
Articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute grant the ICC jurisdiction 
over rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization.  
Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) also grants the Court jurisdiction over any other form of sexual violence 
also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and article 8(2)(e)(vi) grants the 
Court jurisdiction over any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation 
of Common Article 3. 
The specific enumeration of acts of sexual violence makes the Rome Statute unique.  
While most of these acts have been found to be within the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisdiction the 
chambers have found jurisdiction based on customary international law or international 
humanitarian treaty law rather than the statutes.  Thus, when looking for jurisprudence from 
the ad hoc tribunals for Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) offenses one will have to examine the ICTY 
Article 2 cases on torture, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, 
and inhuman treatment.  For Article 8(2)(e)(vi) offenses one should look to the ICTY Article 
3 and ICTR Article 4 cases on torture, cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity. 
D. Cumulative Convictions 
Cumulative convictions under different statutory provisions for the same conduct are 
permissible if the statutory provisions have materially distinct elements that are not contained 
in the other.187  “An element is materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact 
not required by the other.”188  For example, crimes against humanity contain an element that 
is materially distinct from violations of the laws and customs of war.  There must be a close 
link between the alleged acts and the armed conflict for an act to be a violation of the laws 
and customs of war and this requirement does not exist for crimes against humanity.  
Additionally, crimes against humanity must take place within the context of a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population.  Thus, the same conduct can be the basis of 
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convictions for both crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war if 
the necessary elements are met.189  
The Foca Trial Chamber applied this test and convicted Kunarac and Vukovic of rape 
and torture as crimes against humanity and as violations of the laws and customs of war for 
the same acts.190  As noted above the crimes against humanity charges and the violations of 
the laws and customs of war charges each have materially distinct elements.  Rape and torture 
also contain materially distinct elements.  Rape contains a sexual penetration requirement, 
which torture does not, and torture requires the severe infliction of pain or suffering for a 
prohibited purpose, which rape does not.191  This analysis and holding was upheld by the 
Foca Appeals Chamber.192  Based on this jurisprudence Radic in Kvočka was convicted of 
persecution as a crime against humanity and torture as a violation of the laws and customs of 
war based on the rapes and sexual assaults that were committed at the Omarska Camp.193 
As noted in Part III(C)(2), the Semanza Trial Chamber did not convict the Accused of 
cruel treatment as a violation of the laws and customs of war because that charge was based 
on the same facts as the rape as a crime against humanity charge upon which he was 
convicted.  The Semanza Appeals Chamber reversed the acquittal on the cruel treatment 
charge concluding that the Trial Chamber’s failure to enter the conviction was an error.  The 
Appeals Chamber concluded that Semanza’s “convictions for crimes against humanity 
necessitated proof of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, whereas 
convictions for war crimes require that the offences charged be closely related to the armed 
conflict.”194  The Appeals Chamber noted that the Trial Chamber found the necessary nexus 
was established such that the necessary elements of the crimes against humanity and the 
serious violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions were established.  To 
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remedy the Trial Chamber’s error, the Appeals Chamber entered a conviction on the cruel 
treatment charge in the indictment.195 
Krstić was charged with persecution and genocide.  The Trial Chamber held that the 
persecution count was subsumed within the genocide count, thus it was inappropriate to 
convict him on both counts.196  This ruling was reversed on appeal.  The Appeals Chamber 
concluded that persecution as a crime against humanity and genocide have different statutory 
elements such that genocide does not subsume persecution.197  Genocide must be committed 
with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.  
Persecution as a crime against humanity does not require such intent, but it must be 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population and the 
perpetrator must be aware of the relationship.198 
When faced with charges under statutory provisions that do not contain materially 
distinct elements, the chambers at the ad hoc tribunals have to decide upon which statutory 
provision they will enter a conviction.199  The chamber should enter a conviction for the more 
specific provision—the one that contains the materially distinct element.200  For example, 
grave breaches contain an element that is materially distinct from violations of the laws and 
customs of war—that the victim be a protected person.201  Violations of the laws and customs 
of war, however, do not contain an element that is materially distinct from grave breaches.  
Consequently chambers should enter convictions on the grave breach charges because they 
are more specific.202 
E. Criminal Responsibility 
1. Individual Responsibility 
 Pursuant to the Rome Statute, an individual will be criminally responsible for a crime 
within the Court’s jurisdiction if that person “[c]ommits such a crime, whether as an 
individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other 
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person is criminally responsible.”203  Criminal liability also exists for those that facilitate “the 
commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its 
attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission”204 or  
[i]n any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of 
such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.  Such 
contribution shall be intentional and shall either: 
 
(i)  Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose 
involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court; or  
(ii)  Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime.205 
 
Attempts give rise to criminal liability when an individual takes action  
that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime 
does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person’s 
intentions.  However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or 
otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for 
punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that 
person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.206 
 
The ICTY and ICTR Statutes state that “[a] person who planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime 
referred to in articles 2 to 5 [2 to 4 for the ICTR] of the present Statute, shall be individually 
responsible for the crime.”207  The ad hoc tribunals have convicted persons of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes for committing, instigating, aiding and abetting, and 
encouraging acts of sexual violence. 
a. Instigating 
The Akayesu Trial Chamber found the Accused criminally responsible for the 
multiple rapes of ten girls and women in the cultural center of the bureau communal, “the 
rape of Witness OO by an Interahamwe named Antoine in a field near the bureau 
communal,” and “the forced undressing and public marching of Chantal naked at the bureau 
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communal.”208  Akayesu’s responsibility was based on verbal instigation.  Instigating is 
“prompting another to commit an offence.”209 
The Trial Chamber found that when “Witness OO and two other girls were 
apprehended by Interahamwe in flight from the bureau communal, the Interahamwe went to 
the Accused and told him that they were taking the girls away to sleep with them. The 
Accused said ‘take them.’”210  He also “told the Interahamwe to undress Chantal and march 
her around. He was laughing and happy to be watching and afterwards told the Interahamwe 
to take her away and said ‘you should first of all make sure that you sleep with this girl.’”211  
The Trial Chamber concluded that these actions were evidence that Akayesu ordered and 
instigated sexual violence.212 
Semanza was found guilty of rape (crime against humanity) for encouraging a crowd, 
in front of commune and military authorities, to rape Tutsi women before killing them.213  
Immediately after Semanza’s speech one of the men in the audience “had non-consensual 
sexual intercourse with Victim A, who was hiding in a nearby home.”214  The Trial Chamber 
concluded that due to the  
influence of the Accused and to the fact that the rape of Victim A occurred 
directly after the Accused instructed the group to rape, the Chamber finds that 
the Accused’s encouragement constituted instigation because it was causally 
connected and substantially contributed to the actions of the principal 
perpetrator.  The assailant’s statement that he had been given permission to 
rape Victim A is evidence of a clear link between the Accused’s statement and 
the crime.  The Chamber also finds that the Accused made his statement 
intentionally with the awareness that he was influencing the perpetrator to 
commit the crime.215 
 Gacumbitsi was similarly found guilty of rape (crime against humanity) for 
instigating the rape of Tutsi girls “by specifying that sticks be inserted into their genitals in 
case they resisted.”216  The Trial Chamber concluded that the rapes that took place were a 
direct consequence of Gacumbitsi’s instigation due to the closeness in time and space 
between the instigation and the commission of the rapes.217 
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b. Ordering 
Niyitegeka ordered Interahamwe to undress a dead Tutsi woman and insert a piece of 
sharpened wood into her genitalia.218  After the order was given the act was carried out.219  
Finding that the Accused intended this act to be carried out and knew that it was part of a 
widespread and systematic attack on the Tutsi population based on ethnic grounds, the Trial 
Chamber convicted Niyitegeka of other inhumane acts (crime against humanity).220 
c. Committing 
An individual is criminally responsible for committing a crime “when he or she 
physically perpetrates the relevant criminal act or engenders a culpable omission in violation 
of a rule of criminal law.”221  There can be multiple perpetrators of the same crime when “the 
conduct of each one of them fulfills the requisite elements of the definition of the substantive 
offence.”222 
Delic, an accused in the Čelebići case, personally raped Grozdana Cecez and Witness 
A repeatedly and he was convicted of rape based on committing the crime.223  Muhimana was 
similarly found to have personally raped seven women and was convicted of rape (crime 
against humanity).224  In several recent ICTR cases convictions for rape based on the accused 
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personally committing the rape have not been obtained or they have been overturned because 
of insufficient evidence.  The Musema Appeals Chamber overturned Musema’s rape 
conviction because new evidence was presented to the Appeals Chamber that established 
reasonable doubt as to Musema’s guilt.225  In Kamuhanda the Trial Chamber acquitted the 
accused of rape (crime against humanity) because the witnesses who testified about the rapes 
did not observe the rapes themselves, but were told about them after the fact.  The Trial 
Chamber held that such hearsay evidence was insufficient for a rape (crime against humanity) 
conviction.226 
d. Aiding and Abetting 
Aiding and abetting is “rendering a substantial contribution to the commission of a 
crime.”227  In Furundzija, the Trial Chamber held that the actus reus of aiding and abetting in 
international criminal law “requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support 
which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”228  The act of assistance need 
not have caused the act of the principal; it could be an act or omission that took place before, 
during, or after the commission of the crime.229  For example, bringing women to a specific 
location to be raped by soldiers has been held to constitute aiding and abetting rape.230 
Presence during the commission of a crime within the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence 
has been held to constitute aiding and abetting.  The Kayishema Trial Chamber held that the 
presence of a spectator who knew that his or her presence would encourage perpetrators in 
committing their criminal activities can lead to criminal responsibility for the acts committed 
by the perpetrators.231  The Foca Trial Chamber similarly held that while presence at the 
scene of the crime alone is not conclusive evidence of aiding and abetting, such presence can 
constitute aiding and abetting when it “is shown to have a significant legitimizing or 
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encouraging effect on the principal.”232  In Furundzija, the accused interrogated Witness A 
and he was present while another individual repeatedly raped her.  The Trial Chamber 
concluded that Furundzija’s “presence and continued interrogation of Witness A encouraged 
Accused B and substantially contributed to the criminal acts committed by him.”233  He was 
thus found guilty of aiding and abetting the rape of Witness A.234   
The required mens rea is “knowledge that these acts assist the commission of the 
offence.”235  The individual aiding and abetting does not have to share the principal’s mens 
rea, but he or she must know about the essential elements of the crime, which includes the 
perpetrator’s mens rea, and make the conscious decision to act knowing that he or she is 
supporting the commission of the crime.236 
e. Joint Criminal Enterprise 
The ad hoc tribunals have held that “the acts of one person can give rise to the 
criminal culpability of another where both participate in the execution of a common criminal 
plan.”237  In Tadic the Appeals Chamber identified three categories of joint criminal liability 
or common purpose cases.  The first is when all of those participating have the same criminal 
intention.238  For example, the co-perpetrators develop a plan to kill a group of people and 
even though members of the group have different tasks, they all possess the intent to kill.239  
The second category is similar to the first and it is referred to as the “concentration camp” 
cases.  In such cases individuals with a position of authority within a concentration camp 
were held criminally liable for the atrocities that took place within the concentration camps.  
Liability was based on finding that the individual was actively involved in the repressive 
system (as could be inferred from their authoritative position), he or she was aware of the 
nature of the system, and he or she intended to further the common purpose of mistreating 
prisoners.240  The final category of cases addresses individuals who participate in a joint 
criminal enterprise and one of the co-perpetrators commits an act that was outside of the 
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common design, but was nonetheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of carrying out 
the common design.241   
The Tadic Appeals Chamber held that participating in a common criminal enterprise 
gives rise to criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.  Based on 
the object and purpose of the ICTY Statute, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the Statute 
“intends to extend the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal to all those ‘responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law’ committed in the former Yugoslavia 
(Article 1).”242  Thus the Statute does not limit its jurisdiction to those who plan, instigate, 
order, physically perpetuate a crime, or aid and abet in the commission of a crime.  It also 
includes those who work together with several persons having a common purpose to “embark 
on criminal activity that is then carried out either jointly or by some members of this plurality 
of persons.”243  The Rome Statute explicitly provides for jurisdiction over those who 
contribute “to the commission or attempted commission of [a crime within the Court’s 
jurisdiction] by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.”244 
The Tadic Appeals Chamber held that the actus reus for participating in a joint 
criminal enterprise or acting with a common criminal purpose requires: 
1. A plurality of persons. 
 
2. The existence of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to 
or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute. 
 
3. Participation of the accused in the common design involving the 
perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute.245 
 
The people working together do not have to be organized in a particular military, political, or 
administrative structure and their common plan, design, or purpose need not have been 
previously arranged or formulated.246  The necessary participation does not have to involve 
the commission of the crime, but can be assisting in or contributing to the execution of the 
common plan, design, or purpose.247 
The mens rea requirements for joint criminal enterprise liability vary depending upon 
the category of common liability at issue.  For the first category in which the co-perpetrators 
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have the same criminal intention, each accused must have the intent to perpetrate the 
particular crime.248  For “concentration camp” cases, the accused must have personal 
knowledge of the system of ill-treatment and the intent to further the common system of ill-
treatment.249  In the third category of cases, the accused must intend to participate in and 
further the joint criminal enterprise, it must have been foreseeable that a member of the group 
would commit the criminal act outside of the common plan, and the accused must have 
willingly taken that risk.250 
These elements have been applied in Furundzija, Krstić, and Kvočka to hold 
individuals criminally responsible for acts of sexual violence.  The Furundzija Trial Chamber 
found Furundzija guilty of torture (violation of the laws and customs of war) for his 
involvement in the rape and sexual assault of Witness A.  Furundzija interrogated Witness A 
while she was “in a state of nudity.”251  During the interrogation another individual referred 
to as Accused B “rubbed his knife on the inner thighs of Witness A and threatened to cut out 
her private parts if she did not tell the truth in answer to the interrogation by the accused.”252  
A second phase of the interrogation involved Witness A being confronted with Witness D [a 
friend of Witness A’s] to make her confess.  Accused B raped Witness A “by the mouth, 
vagina and anus and forced her to lick his penis clean.”253  Furundzija continued to 
interrogate Witness A and as the interrogation intensified the sexual assaults and rapes 
intensified as well.254  The Trial Chamber concluded that Furundzija’s interrogation and 
Accused B’s rape and sexual assault of Witness A became one process.255  The Trial 
Chamber found that Furundzija and Accused B intended to obtain information from Witness 
A that they believed would be helpful to the Croatian Defence Council.   
The Furundzija Trial Chamber held that to be guilty of torture as a co-perpetrator an 
individual must “participate in an integral part of the torture and partake of the purpose 
behind the torture, that is the intent to obtain information or a confession, to punish or 
intimidate, humiliate, coerce or discriminate against the victim or a third person.”256  
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Furundzija was found criminally liable for the torture of Witness A as a co-perpetrator “by 
virtue of his interrogation of her as an integral part of the torture.”257 
On appeal Furundzija argued that the Prosecutor failed to prove that there was a direct 
connection between his interrogation of Witness A and Accused B’s attacks on Witness A.  
He further contended that there was no proof that he “planned, agreed, or intended that 
Witness A would be touched or threatened in any way in the course of his questioning.”258  
Recalling the Tadic Appeals Judgment, the Furundzija Appeals Chamber stated that co-
perpetrators do not have to have a previously arranged plan, design, or purpose.259  The  
way the events in this case developed precludes any reasonable doubt that the 
Appellant and Accused B knew what they were doing to Witness A and for 
what purpose they were treating her in that manner; that they had a common 
purpose may be readily inferred from all the circumstances, including (1) the 
interrogation of Witness A by the Appellant in both the Large Room while she 
was in a state of nudity, and the Pantry where she was sexually assaulted in the 
Appellant’s presence; and (2) the acts of sexual assault committed by Accused 
B on Witness A in both rooms, as charged in the Amended Indictment.260 
The Appeals Chamber concluded by stating,“[w]here the act of one accused contributes to the 
purpose of the other, and both acted simultaneously, in the same place and within full view of 
each other, over a prolonged period of time, the argument that there was no common purpose 
is plainly unsustainable.”261 
 In Kvočka the accused were tried for their role in the criminal acts that were 
committed at the Omarska camp.  Thus this case closely resembles the second category of 
cases—the concentration camp cases.  Following the Tadic Appeals Chamber, the Kvočka 
Trial Chamber held that to be criminally responsible based on a joint criminal enterprise the 
accused “must have carried out acts that substantially assisted or significantly effected the 
furtherance of the goals of the enterprise, with the knowledge that his acts or omissions 
facilitated the crimes committed through the enterprise.”262  Individuals “who work in a job 
or participate in a system in which crimes are committed on such a large scale and systematic 
basis incur individual criminal responsibility if they knowingly participate in the criminal 
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endeavor, and their acts or omissions significantly assist or facilitate the commission of the 
crimes.”263 
 The Kvočka Trial Chamber concluded that Omarska camp functioned as a joint 
criminal enterprise in which a mix of serious crimes were “committed intentionally, 
maliciously, selectively, and in some instances sadistically against the non-Serbs detained in 
the camp.”264  The crimes were committed by a plurality of persons and the common purpose 
was “to persecute and subjugate non-Serb detainees.”265   
 The five accused were all found guilty of persecution for the sexual assaults and rapes 
that took place in the Omarska camp.  They each worked at the camp and the Trial Chamber 
concluded that they were aware that persecution and ethnic violence were prevalent in the 
camp and that their work facilitated the commission of crimes.266  As for their knowledge, the 
Trial Chamber stated 
anyone regularly working in or visiting Omarska camp would have had to 
know that crimes were widespread throughout the camp.  Knowledge of the 
joint criminal enterprise can be inferred from such indicia as the position held 
by the accused, the amount of time spent in the camp, the function he 
performs, his movement throughout the camp, and any contact he has with 
detainees, staff personnel, or outsiders visiting the camp.  Knowledge of the 
abuses could also be gained through ordinary senses.  Even if the accused 
were not eye-witnesses to crimes committed in Omarska camp, evidence of 
abuses could been seen by observing the bloodied, bruised, and injured bodies 
of detainees, by observing heaps of dead bodies lying in piles around the 
camp, and noticing the emaciated and poor condition of detainees, as well as 
by observing the cramped facilities or the bloodstained walls.  Evidence of 
abuses could be heard from the screams of pain and cries of suffering, from 
the sounds of the detainees begging for food and water and beseeching their 
tormentors not to beat or kill them, and from the gunshots heard everywhere in 
the camp.  Evidence of the abusive conditions in the camp could also be 
smelled as a result of the deteriorating corpses, the urine and feces soiling the 
detainees[’] clothes, the broken and overflowing toilets, the dysentery 
afflicting the detainees, and the inability of detainees to wash or bathe for 
weeks or months.267 
Kvočka’s conviction for persecution was overturned on appeal.  Kvočka argued that the 
Prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the rapes and sexual assaults took 
place during his stay at Omarska camp.  The Trial Chamber held that the accused would not 
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be criminally responsible for crimes committed before they arrived at Omarska camp or after 
they left.  The Appeals Chamber found that there was no evidence before the Trial Chamber 
regarding when the relevant rapes and sexual assaults took place and it noted that the Trial 
Chamber did not rule on this point.268  Thus Kvočka’s conviction for persecution was 
overturned.269 
 Krstić illustrates the third category of common purpose liability.  Krstić participated 
in a joint criminal enterprise “to forcibly transfer the Bosnian Muslim women, children and 
elderly from Potočari on 12 and 13 July and to create a humanitarian crisis.”270  Rape, 
murder, beating, and abuse were not the object of the joint criminal enterprise, but the Trial 
Chamber concluded that such acts were a natural and foreseeable consequence of the ethnic 
cleansing campaign.271  The finding that Krstić participated in a joint criminal enterprise to 
ethnically cleanse the Srebrenica enclave was based on evidence demonstrating that  
the political and/or military leadership of the VRS formulated a plan to 
permanently remove the Bosnian Muslim population from Srebrenica, 
following the take-over of the enclave. From 11 through 13 July, this plan of 
what is colloquially referred to as “ethnic cleansing” was realised mainly 
through the forcible transfer of the bulk of the civilian population out of 
Potočari, once the military aged men had been separated from the rest of the 
population. General Krstić was a key participant in the forcible transfer, 
working in close co-operation with other military officials of the VRS Main 
Staff and the Drina Corps.272 
The Trial Chamber found the mens rea requirements established—rape, murder, beating, and 
abuse were natural and foreseeable consequences of the campaign to ethnically cleanse the 
Srebrenica enclave. 
General Krstić must have been aware that an outbreak of these crimes would 
be inevitable given the lack of shelter, the density of the crowds, the 
vulnerable condition of the refugees, the presence of many regular and 
irregular military and paramilitary units in the area and the sheer lack of 
sufficient numbers of UN soldiers to provide protection. In fact, on 12 July, 
the VRS organised and implemented the transportation of the women, children 
and elderly outside the enclave; General Krstić was himself on the scene and 
exposed to firsthand knowledge that the refugees were being mistreated by 
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VRS or other armed forces.273 
Krstić was charged with persecution and rape was one of the underlying acts.  Krstić was 
held criminally responsible for the rapes that took place in Potočari based on his involvement 
in a joint criminal enterprise in which rape, while not the object of the criminal enterprise, 
was a natural and foreseeable consequence. 
2. Superior or Command Responsibility 
Individuals can also be criminally responsible, as superiors or commanders, for the 
actions of their subordinates.  Article 28 of the Rome Statute states that   
(a)  A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective 
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case 
may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly 
over such forces, where: 
 
(i)  That military commander or person either knew or, owing to 
the circumstances at the time, should have known that the 
forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
 
(ii)  That military commander or person failed to take all necessary 
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or 
repress their commission or to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 
 
(b)  With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in 
paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under 
his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her 
failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where: 
 
(i)  The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded 
information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were 
committing or about to commit such crimes; 
 
(ii)  The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and 
 
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities 
for investigation and prosecution. 
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The ad hoc tribunals’ statutes similarly address superior or commander responsibility. 
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute 
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal 
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about 
to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
perpetrators thereof.274 
The details of this type of responsibility with regard to acts of sexual violence were first 
addressed by the Čelebići Trial Chamber.  This chamber held that the elements for superior or 
command responsibility are: 
(i)  the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; 
 
(ii)  the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was 
about to be or had been committed; and 
 
(iii) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.275   
 
The Čelebići articulation of the superior responsibility elements states the rule applied by the 
ad hoc tribunals.  This statement of the elements was approved by the Čelebići and Blaskic 
Appeals Chambers and has been applied by the Trial Chambers in Foca, Musema, Kvočka, 
Kamuhanda, and Semanza. 
a. Superior-Subordinate Relationship 
To demonstrate a superior-subordinate relationship the accused must have had 
“effective control over the persons committing the underlying violations of international 
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humanitarian law.”276  He or she must have the “material ability to prevent and punish the 
commission of these offenses.”277  The effective control test was adopted in Article 28 of the 
Rome Statute.278  Having effective control and the “material ability to prevent and punish the 
commission of these offenses” does not require being the person that actually dispenses the 
punishment.  The Kvočka Trial Chamber held that the superior need only “take an important 
step in the disciplinary process.”279   
The superior’s authority can be de jure or de facto and the superior responsibility 
concept applies equally to military and civilian supervisors.280  De jure power by itself is not 
enough to establish command or superior responsibility—there must also be a finding of 
effective control.281  The Čelebići Appeals Chamber held, however, that “a court may 
presume that possession of such power prima facie results in effective control unless proof to 
the contrary is produced.”282   
 Substantial influence is not sufficient for establishing effective control.  In addressing 
an argument advanced by the Prosecution on appeal, the Appeals Chamber found that 
customary law has specified a standard of effective control, although it does 
not define precisely the means by which the control must be exercised.  It is 
clear, however, that substantial influence as a means of control in any sense 
which falls short of the possession of effective control over subordinates, 
which requires the possession of material abilities to prevent subordinate 
offences or to punish subordinate offenders, lacks sufficient support in State 
practice and judicial decisions.  Nothing relied on by the Prosecution indicates 
that there is sufficient evidence of State practice or judicial authority to 
support a theory that substantial influence as a means of exercising command 
responsibility has the standing of a rule of customary law, particularly a rule 
by which criminal liability would be imposed.283 
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Additionally, general influence in the relevant community is not sufficient.  In Semanza, the 
Trial Chamber reiterated that the correct legal standard for establishing a superior-
subordinate relationship is showing “a formal or informal hierarchical relationship involving 
an accused’s effective control over the direct perpetrators. A simple showing of an accused’s 
general influence in the community is insufficient to establish a superior-subordinate 
relationship.”284  The Trial Chamber noted that  
[o]ther than general evidence of the Accused’s influence, there is no credible 
or reliable evidence detailing the specific nature of the superior-subordinate 
relationship between the Accused and any of the known perpetrators, 
including those to whom he gave instructions or encouragement to rape and 
kill.  Absent this type of evidence, there is no concrete indication that the 
Accused had actual authority over the principal perpetrators. 
b. Mens rea 
 Superior responsibility does not create strict liability for supervisors who fail to 
prevent or punish the crimes of their subordinates.285  The mens rea requirement is that the 
superior  
(1) had actual knowledge, established through direct or circumstantial 
evidence, that his subordinates were committing or about to commit 
crimes referred to under Article 2 to 5 of the Statute, or  
 
(2) . . . had in his possession information of a nature, which at the least, 
would put him on notice of the risk of such offences by indicating the 
need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether such 
crimes were committed or were about to be committed by his 
subordinates.286 
 
Prosecutors must present direct evidence of knowledge or establish that the superior had such 
knowledge via circumstantial evidence.287  The existence of such knowledge cannot be 
presumed.288  The following indicia can be considered by a Trial Chamber in determining 
whether or not a superior had the requisite knowledge: 
(a) The number of illegal acts; 
(b) The type of illegal acts; 
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(c) The scope of illegal acts; 
(d) The time during which the illegal acts occurred; 
(e) The number and type of troops involved; 
(f) The logistics involved, if any; 
(g) The geographical location of the acts; 
(h) The widespread occurrence of the acts; 
(i) The tactical tempo of operations; 
(j) The modus operandi of similar illegal acts; 
(k) The officers and staff involved; [and] 
(l) The location of the commander at the time.289 
 
In the same way that de jure authority does not prove effective control, it does not prove 
knowledge.290  The information that a superior must have can be written or oral and, while it 
does not have to be explicit, it must “suggest the need to inquire further.”291  The Kvočka 
Trial Chamber specifically noted that “if a superior has prior knowledge that women detained 
by male guards in detention facilities are likely to be subjected to sexual violence, that would 
put him on sufficient notice that extra measures are demanded in order to prevent such 
crimes.”292 
The Prosecutor has sought to expand the mens rea requirement for superior 
responsibility.  In Čelebići the Prosecution sought to satisfy the mens rea requirement by 
showing that a superior lacked the information that put him on notice of the perpetration of 
war crimes “as a result of a serious dereliction of his duty to obtain the information within his 
reasonable access.”293  The Appeals Chamber rejected this argument concluding that 
“[n]eglect of a duty to acquire such knowledge, however, does not feature in the provision as 
a separate offence, and a superior is not therefore liable under the provision for such failures 
but only for failing to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or to punish.”294  
The Kvočka Trial Chamber applied this reasoning when it stated that “Article 7(3) does not 
impose a duty upon a superior to go out of his way to obtain information about crimes 
committed by subordinates, unless he is in some way put on notice that criminal activity is 
afoot.”295   
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In Blaskic the Trial Chamber concluded that the “know or reason to know” 
requirement is satisfied if it is shown that the accused “should have known.”296  The Appeals 
Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that General Blaskic knew or had reason 
to know about the rapes that took place at the Dubravica primary school.  The Trial 
Chamber’s conclusion was based on circumstantial evidence, and from this evidence it 
concluded that “General Blaskic could not have been unaware of the atmosphere of terror and 
the rapes which occurred at the school.”297  The Appeals Chamber overturned this ruling 
stating that  
the Čelebići Appeal Judgement has settled the issue of the interpretation of the 
standard of “had reason to know.”  In that judgement, the Appeals Chamber 
stated that “a superior will be criminally responsible through the principles of 
superior responsibility only if information was available to him which would 
have put him on notice of offences committed by subordinates.”298 
The Appeals Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of the mens rea 
requirement was “not consistent with the jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber.”299 It then 
applied the Čelebići interpretation and concluded that General Blaskic did not have effective 
command or control over the units that committed the rapes and thus reversed his conviction 
for persecution as a crime against humanity, which was partially based on rape.300 
c. Actus rea 
 Superiors are required to “take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the 
commission of offences by their subordinates or, if such crimes have been committed, to 
punish the perpetrators thereof.”301  Stating that the evaluation of this factor is “inextricably 
linked to the facts,” the Čelebići Appeals Chamber did not offer a general standard.302  
Superiors can only be criminally liable for failing to take action that is within their powers.303  
What is within a superior’s power is that which is “within his material possibility.”304  
Additionally, causation is not an element of superior responsibility.305 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 Sexual violence is as much a part of war as murder is.  The ad hoc tribunals’ 
jurisprudence provides persuasive authority for the adjudication of sexual crimes at the ICC.  
While there is always room for improvement, the ad hoc tribunals have provided a strong 
foundation upon which the ICC can build.  As the ad hoc tribunals implement their 
Completion Strategies, there are several cases currently pending at the ICTR that should be 
monitored for further jurisprudential developments.  These cases include the Butre Case, 
Karemera, Muranyi, Military I, Military II, and Government I.306  The charges in these cases 
include rape and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity.  Additionally, there are several 
other cases in which indictments have been issued, but the trials have yet to begin that 
address acts of sexual violence.  In Bisengimana the accused is charged with rape, torture, 
and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity, cruel treatment and torture as violations of the 
laws and customs of war.307  Juvenal Rugambarara has been charged with rape and torture as 
crimes against humanity and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular rape and enforced 
prostitution as serious violations of the laws and customs of war.308  In Hategekiman, 
Mpambara, Bikindi, and Nzabirinda the accused are charged with a variety of crimes 
including genocide based on acts of sexual violence, rape, persecution and inhumane acts as 
crimes against humanity.309 
 The Preamble to the Rome Statute states that “the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole must not go unpunished” and that the State Parties 
are determined “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to 
                                                                                                                                                    
causation has not traditionally been postulated as a conditio sine qua non for the imposition of 
criminal liability on superiors for their failure to prevent or punish offences committed by 
their subordinates.  Accordingly, the Trial Chamber has found no support for the existence of 
a requirement of proof of causation as a separate element of superior responsibility, either in 
the existing body of case law, the formulation of the principle in existing treaty law, or, with 
one exception, in the abundant literature on this subject. 
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contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”  It is hoped that this report will aid lawyers, 
judges, academics, and activists in ensuring that these pledges are implemented with regard 
to wartime acts of sexual violence. 
67 
ANNEX I: CRIMINAL CHARGES & THE RELEVANT AD HOC TRIBUNAL 
CASES 
 
CRIME CASE TRIBUNAL/COURT 
GENOCIDE Akayesu ICTR 
 Gacumbitsi ICTR 
 Kajelijeli ICTR 
 Kamuhanda ICTR 
 Kayishema ICTR 
 Krstić ICTY 
 Muhimana ICTR 
 Musema ICTR 
 Niyitegeka ICTR 
 Stakic ICTY 
   
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY   
Enslavement Foca ICTY 
Torture Foca ICTY 
 Kvočka ICTY 
 Semanza ICTR 
 Simic ICTY 
Rape Akayesu ICTR 
 Foca ICTY 
 Gacumbitsi ICTR 
 Kajelijeli ICTR 
 Kamuhanda ICTR 
 Kvočka ICTY 
 Muhimana ICTR 
 Musema ICTR 
 Nikolic ICTY 
 Semanza ICTR 
 Stakic ICTY 
Persecution Krstić ICTY 
 Kupreskić ICTY 
 Kvočka ICTY 
 Nikolic ICTY 
 Plavsic ICTY 
 Stakic ICTY 
 Todorović ICTY 
Other inhumane acts Bagilishema ICTR 
 CDF SCSL 
 Kayishema ICTR 
 Niyitegeka ICTR 
   
WAR CRIMES   
Torture Čelebići ICTY 
68 
CRIME CASE TRIBUNAL/COURT 
 Foca ICTY 
 Furundzija ICTY 
 Musema ICTR 
Rape Čelebići ICTY 
 Furundzija ICTY 
Cruel Treatment Čelebići ICTY 
 Semanza ICTR 
 Simic ICTY 
Outrages upon personal dignity Cesic ICTY 
 Foca ICTY 
 Kamuhanda ICTR 
 Musema ICTR 
 Semanza ICTR 
Wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health 
Čelebići ICTY 
Inhuman treatment Čelebići ICTY 
   
CUMULATIVE CONVICTIONS Čelebići ICTY 
 Foca ICTY 
 Krstić ICTY 
 Kvočka ICTY 
 Semanza ICTR 
   
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY    
Individual Responsibility Akayesu ICTR 
 Čelebići ICTY 
 Foca ICTY 
 Furundzija ICTY 
 Gacumbitsi ICTR 
 Kamuhanda ICTR 
 Kayishema ICTR 
 Krstić ICTY 
 Kvočka ICTY 
 Muhimana ICTR 
 Niyitegeka ICTR 
 Semanza ICTR 
 Tadic ICTY 
Superior or Command Responsibility Blaskic ICTY 
 Čelebići ICTY 
 Foca ICTY 
 Kamuhanda ICTR 
 Krstić ICTY 
 Kvočka ICTY 
 Musema ICTR 
 Semanza ICTR 
 
 
